Praveen Kumar

Praveen Kumar

6/2/2025, 12:11:01 PM

*Raju Naidu V. Chenmouga Sundra (2025 SC)* 1. Doctrine of merger: The period of limitation of 12 years for the execution of a decree starts from the date of the order of the Appellate Court as the decree of trial court merges into that of the Appellate Court. 2. If the decree is silent on the time limit to deposit advance money, the executing court can grant time-extension. This will not amount to “going behind the decree”. 3. Lis pendens: Transferee pendente lite are bound by the outcome of the litigation. The protection of S.53A is not available to a person who took possession despite being aware of the pending litigation.

Praveen Kumar

6/2/2025, 11:17:16 AM

*Manish Rathore V. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 SC)* 1. FIR was registered against the petitioner. SC granted him interim protection from arrest. Order was supplied to Police. 2. Police applied before the Sessions court and added more serious offences to the FIR. And arrested the petitioner despite SC order. 3. SC deprecated this conduct of the Police to defeat the interim order and held that the Police should have sought the leave of SC before arresting the petitioner. Bail granted.

Praveen Kumar

6/9/2025, 5:19:24 AM

*Padman Bibhar V. State of Odisha (2025 SC)* 1. *Ramanand V. State of Himachal Pradesh (1981 SC)* was quoted: “_perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world and absolute certainty is a myth_”. 2. The prosecution is obliged to prove each circumstance, taken cumulatively to form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probabilities, crime was committed by the accused and none else. Further, the facts so proved should unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused. 3. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more (corroborative evidence) establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant. 4. ⁠*Sujit Biswas V. State of Assam (2013 SC)* was quoted: “_Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that "may be" proved, and something that "will be proved"….. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between "may be" true and "must be" true, the court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of *dispassionate judicial scrutiny*, based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record._”.

Praveen Kumar

6/2/2025, 11:03:39 AM

*Ritesh Kumar V. The State of Bihar (2025 SC)* Impugned Order passed by Patna HC while granting the Anticipatory Bail: “It is further made clear that if chargesheet is submitted against the petitioner connecting him with the offence, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court *SHALL* take all course of steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.” SC: There could not have been a specific direction that upon submission of the chargesheet, the court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar. The High Court could have just left it open for the trial court to consider the matter upon the petitioner appearing, and then taking a call without there being any mandamus issued to take him into custody.

Praveen Kumar

6/2/2025, 11:24:16 AM

*MD Gulzar V. State of Bihar (2025 SC)* 1. HC denied Bail and imposed a condition that the petitioner can file fresh Bail Application only after one year. 2. SC held that such a condition imposing moratorium of one year for moving the fresh Bail application could not be imposed.

Praveen Kumar

6/2/2025, 12:40:01 PM

*Yerikala Sunkalamma V. State of Andhra Pradesh (2025 SC)* 1. S.113 BSA raises a statutory presumption of ownership in favour of the person in possession. A person in possession is entitled to remain in possession until another person can disclose a better title u/s.113 BSA. This section does not make any distinction between the government and a private citizen. Therefore, it equally applies where a government claims to be the owner or challenges the ownership of the person who is in possession of the property. The onus is, therefore, on the state to prove that it has a subsisting title. (Maxims- “possession follows title”, “possession is the prima facie proof of ownership”.) 2. Suits for declaration of title u/s.27 of the Limitation Act, against the Government are different from the suits against individuals in 2 aspects- Firstly, there is a presumption available in favour of the government that all property is the property of the government, unless any person can establish his title. Secondly, such suits are governed by Article 112 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of 30 years of adverse possession against the State (not 12 years as against any private citizen). 3. A decree declaring title against the government must not be passed casually. 4. The primary objective behind Section 80 of the CPC is to provide the Government or a public officer with an opportunity to assess the legal merits of a claim and potentially settle it if it appears to be just and reasonable. Unlike private parties, the Government is expected to objectively and impartially evaluate the matter, seek appropriate legal advice, and make decisions in public interest within the two-month period mandated by the section. This serves to save both time and taxpayer's money by preventing needless litigation. The legislative intent is to ensure that public funds are not squandered on unnecessary legal battles. The provision of the notice is intended to prompt the Government or public officer to engage in negotiations for a fair settlement or, at the very least, to explain to the potential plaintiff why their claim is being contested. However, in practice, such notices have become empty formalities. The administration frequently remains unresponsive and fails to even inform the aggrieved party why their claim has been rejected. Hence, the LCI has even recommended to delete this section. 5. The SC has directed this judgment to be circulated in all states (HCs and Governments) with emphasis on S.80: “We make it abundantly clear that the Public Authorities must take statutory notice issued to them in all seriousness. The Public Authorities must not sit over such notices and force the citizens to the vagaries of litigation. They are expected to let the plaintiff know their stand within the statutory period or in any case before he embarks upon the litigation. In certain cases, courts may be obliged to draw adverse presumption against the Public Authorities for not acknowledging the notice or telling the plaintiff of its stand and in the absence of that, a stand taken during the course of trial may be considered as an afterthought.”

Praveen Kumar

6/9/2025, 10:50:30 AM

*C. Kamalakkannan V. State of Tamil Nadu (2025 SC)* 1. Facts: Accused sent the forged marksheet in a postal cover. The prosecution relied upon the Opinion of Handwriting Expert who deposed that the postal cover bore the handwriting of the accused. However, the original postal cover could not be traced and produced in the evidence. 2. ⁠SC acquitted the accused and held that “_an expert deposes and not decides_”. 3. The science of identification of handwriting is not so perfect, and the risk is higher. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him. Having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed with caution. 4. In the present case, the prosecution failed to lead the primary evidence, in the form of the original postal cover. Non-exhibiting of the original document would lead to the only possible inference that the postal cover was never proved as per law, and hence, the evidentiary value of the handwriting expert’s report, concluding that the postal cover bore the handwriting of the accused is rendered redundant. 5. SC relied upon the _locus classicus_ on the evidentiary value of expert opinion i.e. *Murari Lal V. State of M.P. (1980 SC)*.

Praveen Kumar

6/9/2025, 10:27:19 AM

*Smt. Lavanya C V. Vittal Gurudas Pai (D) (2025 SC)* 1. U/O.39 R.2A CPC, even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. It may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside. 2. *Kanwar Singh Saini V. High Court of Delhi (2012 SC)* was quoted: “_Application u/O.39 R.2A CPC Lies only where the disobedience or breach of an injunction granted or order complained of was one that is granted by the court u/O.39 R.1&2 CPC, which is naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order. No Litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of a case in the court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case, and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. In case there is a grievance of non-compliance with the terms of the decree passed in the civil suit, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to approach the execution court u/O.21 R.32 CPC which provides for elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and can examine and cross examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in contempt, which are summary in nature. Application u/O.39 R.2A CPC is not maintainable once the suit stood decreed. Law does not permit to skip the remedies available u/O.21 R.32 CPC and resort to contempt proceedings. Thus, the violation of permanent injunction can be set right in executing the proceedings and not the contempt proceedings. There is a complete fallacy in the argument that the provisions of O.39 R.2A CPC would also include the case of breach of permanent injunction granted at the time of passing of the decree_”.

Praveen Kumar

6/2/2025, 1:00:33 PM

*Ram Lal V. Jarnail Singh (2025 SC)* 1. U/s.28 SRA, the decree of specific performance of an Agreement to Sell is in the nature of a preliminary decree and the trial court retains jurisdiction over it. The court does not become functus officio and has jurisdiction over the decree till the sale deed is executed. 2. O.20 R.12A CPC prescribes that every decree of specific performance of an Agreement to Sell shall prescribe a time limit for the payment of balance consideration. The decreeing court has the power to extend this time limit u/s.28 SRA. 3. In the present case, the trial court gave 2 months time to the plaintiff to pay the balance consideration amount. However, the defendant challenged the decree. The Appellate Court dismissed the Appeal and directed specific performance BUT didn’t specify any time limit for payment. The plaintiff filed execution after 2 years and the execution court allowed him to pay balance sale consideration. SC held that if there’s no time limit in the decree, the plaintiff (Decree Holder) shall pay balance consideration amount within reasonable period. (SC asked the plaintiff to pay 9% p.a. interest now). 4. ⁠”This litigation is an eye-opener for the appellate courts reminding that they owe a duty to comply with the provisions of Order XX Rule 12A of the CPC. Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. It is too much to say that since the trial court had granted two months time to the decree holder to deposit the balance sale consideration the same time period would apply even to the decree that may be drawn by the appellate court. What is executable is the decree passed by the appellate court. The appellate court owes a duty to specify the time period.”.

Praveen Kumar

6/2/2025, 11:55:19 AM

*Sharmila Velamur Versus V. Sanjay (2025 SC)* 1. The fundamental principle guiding the custody is the doctrine of _parens patriae_ i.e. it is the duty of the courts to determine the course of action that would best serve the interests and welfare of the child. 2. One of the factors to determine the best interests of a child is: the wishes of the child (only if the child is capable of making independent decisions). 3. With respect to the mental capacity of making independent decisions, the Courts have to form their own opinion. Courts can interact with the child as well. But the courts should also consider the medical opinion. Courts cannot discard the expert’s opinion as a whole. 4. In the event there is any confusion or doubt regarding a person's capacity and ability to make independent decisions and if there is a definitive opinion on disability endorsed by a specialist, domain expert, or a doctor, the Court should give due credence to that opinion. If the expert's report concludes that the mental or physical age of the person concerned is well below the age of majority, there can be no inference of any 'implied' or ‘express' consent to any act which might have a substantive impact on the consenting person. Unless there are strong reasons to disbelieve an expert's report to this effect, the Courts must be overly-cautious in coming to a finding contrary thereto.