Praveen Kumar

Praveen Kumar

2/19/2025, 10:55:11 AM

*Vasant V. The State of Karnataka (2025 SC)* Part-C 12. There may even be cases where a person might be found guilty of an offence u/s. 149 IPC though it was committed quite contrary to his own intention. 13. ⁠Supposing for instance, an unlawful assembly is formed with the object of wiping out all members of a particular community residing in a mohalla. While this assembly is busy in its unlawful activities, some of its members might come across a member of the other community and might in prosecution of the common object proceed to murder him. 14. ⁠But a particular individual, say X, who is a member of this very unlawful assembly might discover that Y was his old friend. X might not want that this old friend of his should be killed, and in spite of his wishes, and contrary to his intentions, Y might be murdered. 15. ⁠If it so happens, then X who was a member of the unlawful assembly, might be held to be guilty of an offence committed by another member of the said assembly, even though the offence itself was committed quite contrary to his desires and even in opposition to his own intention provided it is shown that X continued to remain a member of the assembly at the time of the offence and the offence itself was directly or indirectly within the purview of the common object of the assembly. 16. ⁠The reason is that the criminal liability u/s. 149 IPC is determined not by the intention of the various individual members constituting it but by the common object of the assembly as a whole.

Praveen Kumar

2/19/2025, 10:49:20 AM

*Vasant V. The State of Karnataka (2025 SC)* Part-B 5. ⁠S. 149 IPC, however, disregards the intentions of the individual members of the assembly and concentrates only on the Common Object (CO) of the assembly as a whole. Hence, a person might be guilty of an offence u/s. 149 IPC though he individually had no intention to commit it or was even unaware of its commission or that the offence was committed contrary to his individual intention. *(A beautiful example in Part-C)*. 6. ⁠Participation of the individual offender in the criminal act in some form or the other which is the leading feature of S.34 IPC differentiates it not only from S.149 IPC, but also from other affiliated offences like criminal conspiracy and abetment. A bare agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act might make a person liable for the offence of criminal conspiracy as defined in S.120 IPC. 7. ⁠If the said agreement is to commit offence, then such an agreement is by itself enough to make a man guilty and no overt act apart from the agreement would be necessary. If, however, the agreement is to commit an act which is not tantamount to an offence, then some overt act in pursuance thereof is necessary. Such overt act may, however, be performed by any person who is a party to the agreement and not necessarily by the particular accused who might be guilty of the offence without having participated in the act. 8. ⁠On the other hand, u/s. 34 IPC, a mere agreement, although it might be a sufficient proof of the common intention, would be wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction with the application of S.34 IPC, unless some criminal act is done in furtherance of the said common intention and the accused himself has in some way or the other participated in the commission of the said act. The offence itself would be complete even though the act abetted is not committed; or, even if the act is committed, the abettor himself has not participated in it. Thus, actual participation in the commission of the offence, which is a condition precedent of S.34 and is its main feature, again distinguishes it from the offence of abetment. 9. ⁠S.34 IPC, compendiously summarises the liability imposed under English Law on what are therein called as principal in the first degree and principal in the second degree and assimilates the principles underlying both by compressing them in one section and treating them as what have been called accessories at the fact as opposed to what are termed as accessories before the fact and accessories after the fact. 10. ⁠A person present on the scene might or might not be guilty by the application of S.34 IPC. If he is present on the scene for the purpose of participating in the offence, he would certainly be guilty as a participator in the offence. On the other hand, if he is present there merely as a spectator (eg. eyewitness), he would not be guilty. is committed. Also, mere presence on the spot for the purpose of facilitating or promoting the offence is itself tantamount to actual participation in the criminal act. 11. It may be agreed between the two that the person who knows him will stand near the man who would be the victim and thereby enable the person to whom the part of killing is assigned to identify the victim. If the scheme is carried out, both would be guilty u/S.34, IPC, even though the man who stood near the victim was merely present on the spot and apparently did nothing. If, however, the scheme is analysed, it would appear that by his presence near the victim he played a very important part.

Praveen Kumar

2/19/2025, 10:41:18 AM

*Vasant V. The State of Karnataka (2025 SC)* (Every word of this judgment is important and hence the summary is a longer one) Part-A 1. Dying Declaration of the victim: “My mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and set me on fire by a matchstick. My husband poured water but couldn’t stop the fire”. The victim was taken to the hospital by neighbours. 2. ⁠HC convicted both Mother-in-law and Husband. HC held that the husband was present at the crime scene but didn’t bother to take the wife to the hospital as he wanted to ensure that she dies. Infact, he disappeared suddenly. Hence, the husband was held guilty of murder as he shared the common intention with her mother u/s.34 IPC. 3. ⁠SC acquitted the husband while holding the mother guilty. SC held that mere presence at the crime scene without any participation doesn’t amount to common intention. 4. ⁠SC cited the _locus classicus_ *Om Prakash V. State (1956 All HC)*: (i) Common Intention (CI) u/s.34 IPC is CI “of all” and not CI of “some”. It should be attributable to every member of the group. CI doesn’t disregard the intention of the individual offender. It postulates that there was an intention to commit offence in the mind of the individual offender and the same intention was also present jointly in the mind of every other members of the group. (ii) CI need not be same as “mens rea” or guilty intention which is an ingredient of crime. Guilty intention might be coincident with or collateral to the common intention.

Praveen Kumar

2/19/2025, 9:32:31 AM

*Tilku @ Tilak Singh V. The State of Uttarakhand (2025 SC)* 1. The prosecutrix had voluntarily gone along with the accused, traveled in buses to various places for around 20 days and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun. 2. ⁠A perusal of testimony of the prosecutrix itself would reveal that she had gone on her own accord with the accused. Therefore, the defence of the accused that he had married the prosecutrix and not only that but also that the marriage was certified before the competent authority at Dehradun and thereafter they were living as husband and wife at Dehradun is a plausible defence. 3. ⁠In view of the 2 conflicting medical opinions regarding the age of the prosecutrix, the benefit of doubt lies in the favour of the accused. 4. ⁠Even if the age of the prosecutrix is believed to be between 16-18 years, still the offence of kidnapping u/s. 363 & 366 IPC is not made out as the prosecutrix was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. And she had gone willingly with the accused. 5. ⁠SC relied upon the landmark judgment of *S Vardarajan V. State of Madras (1964 SC)*. SC emphasised that for the offence of kidnapping, “taking” or “enticing” away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient u/s. 361 IPC. In the present case, the role played by the accused does not amount to “taking”.

Praveen Kumar

2/17/2025, 1:10:28 PM

*Om Prakash Gupta @ Lalloowa V. Satish Chandra (2025 SC)* 1. O.22 R.1 CPC provides that when a party to a suit passes away, the suit will not abate if the right to sue survives. However, the suit automatically abates when an application to substitute the LRs of the deceased party under Rules 3/4 of O.22 is not filed within 90 days from the date of death (Article 120 of the Limitation Act). (This 90 days is from the date of death and not from the date of knowledge of death). 2. ⁠If LRs were not substituted within 90 days, and the suit abates, a further remedy is provided under O.22 R.9 CPC. The plaintiff can file an application seeking setting aside of the abatement within a period of 60 days (Article 121 of the Limitation Act). Therefore, between the 91st and the 150th day after the death, one has to file an application for setting aside the abatement. 3. ⁠On and beyond the 151st day, this remedy also becomes time barred. Consequently, any application seeking to set aside the abatement must then be accompanied by a request contained in an application for condonation of delay u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. O. 22 R.3/4 CPC does not provide as to which party shall file such an application for substitution of LRs. Ordinarily, the plaintiff should file such an application as the abetment of the suit would benefit the defendant. However, such an application can also be filed by the LRs of the deceased defendant. 5. O.22 R.10A casts a duty upon a pleader appearing for a party to the suit to intimate the court about the death of such party. It further provides that once the court is informed by the pleader of a party that he is no more, the court shall notify the opposing party of the death. The court’s obligation to issue notice to the other party is indeed mandatory. However, this obligation may not arise in all circumstances. For example, when the opposite party was already present in the court, when the pleader of the deceased party has intimated the court about the death. 6. The provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, have to be considered liberally. A simple prayer for bringing the LRs on record, without specifically praying for setting aside of an abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abetment. The court reiterated the need for justice oriented approach while following the procedure.

Praveen Kumar

2/17/2025, 12:35:09 PM

*The State of Maharashtra V. Prism Cement Ltd. (2025 SC)* 1. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective in nature unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operations. Unless there are words in the statutes sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only. 2. ⁠ Every statute, it is said, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect.

Praveen Kumar

2/17/2025, 12:28:10 PM

*Bhudev Mallick V. Ranajit Ghosal (2025 SC)* 1. Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides that there is no period of limitation for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction. 2. ⁠S.51,58 and O.21 R.32 CPC: Every breach of an injunction is independent and actionable in law, making the judgment-debtor answerable. where there are successive breaches of decree, the judgment-debtor can be dealt with on every such breach, and the doctrine of Res Judicata has no application. A decree for injunction could be enforced by the detention of the judgment-debtor in a civil prison, if he has wilfully failed to obey such decree despite having had an opportunity of obeying it. But the court should not make an order for detention, unless it is satisfied that the judgment-debtor has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and yet has wilfully disobeyed it. The burden of proof will be upon the decree-holder to place materials before the executing court as would enable it to conclude (i) that the person bound by the decree was fully aware of the terms of the decree and its binding nature upon him, and (ii) that the person has had an opportunity of obeying such decree, but has wilfully i.e. consciously and deliberately, disobeyed such decree, so that it can make an order of his detention as sought for.

Praveen Kumar

2/17/2025, 12:08:56 PM

*Vinod Kumar V. State (GNCTD) (2025 SC)* The SC has made the following observations on the correct procedure of contradicting a Witness on the basis of his S.161 CrPC statements: “ Before we part with the judgment, we must refer to a peculiar practice followed by the trial court. Witnesses were confronted in the cross-examination with their statements u/s.161 CrPC. In the depositions, it is mentioned that the attention of the witness was invited to a particular portion of the prior statement. After recording the answer of the witness, the portion of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has been reproduced in brackets. The law is well settled. The portion of the prior statement shown to the witness for contradicting the witness must be proved through the investigating officer. Unless the said portion of the prior statement used for contradiction is proved, it cannot be reproduced in the deposition of the witnesses. The correct procedure is that the trial judge should mark the portions of the prior statements used for contradicting the witness. The said portion can be put in a bracket and marked as AA, BB etc. The marked portions cannot form a part of the deposition, unless the same are proved. *NOTE*: As per me, this is an incomplete understanding of the S.145 IEA. As held in *Tahsildar Singh V. State of UP (1959 SC)*, *Bhagwan Singh V. State of Punjab (1952 SC)* : Resort to S.145 is necessary, only if the witness denies that he has made the prior statement. Then only it would be necessary to prove that the witness has made the prior statement through the investigating officer. If the witness admits the making of the prior statement, then the previous statement in writing need not be proved.

Praveen Kumar

2/17/2025, 11:27:17 AM

*M/s. Tomorrowland Ltd. V. HUDCO Ltd. (2025 SC)* 1. The award of “interest” u/s. 34 CPC is a discretionary exercise steeped in equitable considerations and also ensuring neither undue enrichment nor unfair deprivation. 2. ⁠ As a general principle, in commercial disputes, the award of interest, pendente lite or post decree, is typically granted as a matter of course. This is because such interest serves to compensate the aggrieved party for the time value of money that was due but withheld during the legal process. It reflects an established norm aimed at ensuring fairness and equity in commercial transactions. 3. ⁠However, the court may deny the interest on the money ordered to be refunded if the conduct of the party is rife with instances where it has also sought to undermine the authority and integrity of the judicial process, by treating the court with disregard, and attempting to exploit procedural mechanisms for personal gain.

Praveen Kumar

2/17/2025, 11:07:53 AM

*Puja Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Goa (2025 SC)* Relying upon *Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd. V. UP SEB (1997 SC)* and *Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. V. State of UP (1979 SC)* 1. Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel: Where the government makes a promise, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the government would be held bound by the promise, and the promise would be enforceable against the government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise, and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. 2. ⁠ The law of promissory estoppel furnishes a cause of action to a citizen, enforceable in a court of law, against the government, if it or its officials in course of their authority, extend any promise which creates or is capable of creating a legal relationship, and it is acted upon by the promisee, irrespective of any prejudice. 3. ⁠The doctrine of Estoppel represents a principal evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel the government or the public Authority to carry out a representation or a promise, which is contrary to the law or which was outside the authority of the officer to make. 4. ⁠Hence, in equity, “public interest” is an exception to the principle of promissory estoppel. 5. ⁠Also, if the promisee would be restored to status quo ante and would be placed in the same position in which they were prior to the promise, there will be no promissory estoppel on the government. In the present case, the state of Goa promised for 25% rebate in electricity consumption, which was later on withdrawn in public interest i.e. “financial crunch”. The Supreme Court accepted that the state of Goa can do so, and will not be bound by the promissory estoppel.