*Vasant V. The State of Karnataka (2025 SC)* Part-B 5. ⁠S. 149 IPC, however, disregards the intentions of the individual members of the assembly and concentrates only on the Common Object (CO) of the assembly as a whole. Hence, a person might be guilty of an offence u/s. 149 IPC though he individually had no intention to commit it or was even unaware of its commission or that the offence was committed contrary to his individual intention. *(A beautiful example in Part-C)*. 6. ⁠Participation of the individual offender in the criminal act in some form or the other which is the leading feature of S.34 IPC differentiates it not only from S.149 IPC, but also from other affiliated offences like criminal conspiracy and abetment. A bare agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act might make a person liable for the offence of criminal conspiracy as defined in S.120 IPC. 7. ⁠If the said agreement is to commit offence, then such an agreement is by itself enough to make a man guilty and no overt act apart from the agreement would be necessary. If, however, the agreement is to commit an act which is not tantamount to an offence, then some overt act in pursuance thereof is necessary. Such overt act may, however, be performed by any person who is a party to the agreement and not necessarily by the particular accused who might be guilty of the offence without having participated in the act. 8. ⁠On the other hand, u/s. 34 IPC, a mere agreement, although it might be a sufficient proof of the common intention, would be wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction with the application of S.34 IPC, unless some criminal act is done in furtherance of the said common intention and the accused himself has in some way or the other participated in the commission of the said act. The offence itself would be complete even though the act abetted is not committed; or, even if the act is committed, the abettor himself has not participated in it. Thus, actual participation in the commission of the offence, which is a condition precedent of S.34 and is its main feature, again distinguishes it from the offence of abetment. 9. ⁠S.34 IPC, compendiously summarises the liability imposed under English Law on what are therein called as principal in the first degree and principal in the second degree and assimilates the principles underlying both by compressing them in one section and treating them as what have been called accessories at the fact as opposed to what are termed as accessories before the fact and accessories after the fact. 10. ⁠A person present on the scene might or might not be guilty by the application of S.34 IPC. If he is present on the scene for the purpose of participating in the offence, he would certainly be guilty as a participator in the offence. On the other hand, if he is present there merely as a spectator (eg. eyewitness), he would not be guilty. is committed. Also, mere presence on the spot for the purpose of facilitating or promoting the offence is itself tantamount to actual participation in the criminal act. 11. It may be agreed between the two that the person who knows him will stand near the man who would be the victim and thereby enable the person to whom the part of killing is assigned to identify the victim. If the scheme is carried out, both would be guilty u/S.34, IPC, even though the man who stood near the victim was merely present on the spot and apparently did nothing. If, however, the scheme is analysed, it would appear that by his presence near the victim he played a very important part.