The Kremlin Wants to Avoid High-Profile Governor Dismissals, but Rotations Are Possible This Spring According to two sources from “Nezygar,” federal political administrators are striving to minimize the dynamics of personnel conflicts in regions where the terms of incumbent governors are set to expire this year. To achieve this, they have decided to demonstratively support governors rumored to be on their way out. The Kremlin is signaling that, amid the ongoing Special Military Operation, the typical trend is not towards personnel changes unless necessitated by the need to enhance regional governance. As an example, the sources point to President Putin’s meeting with Bryansk region governor Alexander Bogomaz, which the Kremlin deliberately highlighted in the public sphere. According to one source, this was a signal that “the incumbent governor is staying,” meaning that rumors of his possible dismissal will quickly subside. A source in Bryansk noted that “everyone in the region had already sent Bogomaz into retirement. They were saying his fate was sealed and that the region was expecting a new leader. Bogomaz himself was shuttling back and forth to Moscow, spending hours waiting in the offices of Medvedev, Kiriyenko, and the younger Patrushev.” Similarly, the Kremlin had previously backed the governors of Irkutsk (Igor Kobzev) and Kostroma (Sergey Sitnikov), with “Vedomosti” publishing near-simultaneous managed leaks from the Presidential Administration suggesting that these governors were “likely” to retain their posts. However, not everyone in the Kremlin agrees with these leaks, with some considering them “situational and reflective of specific individuals’ positions.” One source claims that similar public support may soon be extended to other governors whose terms expire between 2023 and 2025—particularly in “dreary” regions. According to federal curators, the key factors for retention are control over the region, the governor’s distance from major scandals or criminal cases, and the overall stability of governance. “Since personnel reshuffles in most cases won’t significantly improve the socio-economic situation in the region, it’s simply easier to keep the current leaders in place,” explains a political analyst close to the Kremlin. For many governors, the example of the Kostroma region is particularly telling. Sergey Sitnikov has led the region since 2012, and if he secures another term, he could mark 18 years in office. “Sitnikov is a former head of Roskomnadzor and a client of Yuri Kovalchuk. Kostroma is his small personal fiefdom; the region is poor, and no one is particularly eager to govern it. Fishing, hunting, and bathhouses are the main resources Sitnikov fully exploits.” According to one source, this kind of personnel “stagnation” is a deliberate strategy for “dreary regions” where “nothing happens” and investors are hesitant to invest. The Kremlin, the sources say, does not expect a sudden economic boom in poor regions but values stability and the absence of “social unrest.” At the same time, several sources identify the gubernatorial positions in the Krasnodar Krai and Leningrad Region as “problematic.” According to insiders, Veniamin Kondratyev (Krasnodar Krai) has long faced destabilization attempts from local elites: amid scandals over oil spill clean-ups, his approval ratings have dropped, and rumors of his dismissal are actively fueled by his opponents. Similar difficulties allegedly plague Alexander Drozdenko (Leningrad Region). Once again, the fate of Sverdlovsk Region Governor Yevgeny Kuyvashev is under threat. “A broad coalition has formed against him. This includes Kiriyenko with Zhog, Volodin, and Gromov. The Yeltsin Center factor also plays a negative role: Kuyvashev was asked to regulate the public activity of the center, but scandals keep arising,” says a local source. Once again, rumors have surfaced that the head of the Presidential Administration’s Domestic Policy Department, Andrey Yarin, may take over as governor.