The Kremlin wants to avoid high-profile governor dismissals, but rotations may still happen as early as spring-2 Governors Mikhail Razvozhayev (Sevastopol) and Vladimir Solodov (Kamchatka Krai) appear noticeably more confident, according to sources, as their re-election is hardly in question. “Sevastopol is in a frontline zone, and there is no sense in replacing a capable governor. Kamchatka’s governor, Solodov, has the support of Yury Trutnev.” On the other hand, the head of the Arkhangelsk region, Alexander Tsybulsky, reportedly “wants to return to the federal center” himself—he is said to still have connections in the Ministry of Economic Development, where he worked before his regional appointment. There are also many rumors about the possible resignation of Dmitry Makhonin (Perm Krai). He is considered a “weak player” who “does not control the resource elites.” “Makhonin was previously seen as a nominee of the Sechin group and former FAS head Artemyev. Now Sechin’s position has somewhat shifted, Artemyev is in the shadows, while Yury Trutnev likely wants to regain control over the region. So Makhonin’s fate hangs in the balance.” Oleg Nikolaev (Chuvashia), according to one source, failed to strengthen his power at the municipal level during his first term, but “there are no complaints against him. Nikolaev has good contacts with Chemezov, Rostec, and Makhmudov.” However, some unexpected appointments are also expected. One source mentioned that in April–May, some governors whose terms are not expiring soon may step down. Among the “candidates” mentioned are Artur Parfenchikov (Karelia), Valentin Konovalov (Khakassia), Radiy Khabirov (Bashkortostan), and Alexey Teksler (Chelyabinsk region). Khabirov and Teksler reportedly have extremely tense relations with law enforcement agencies and occasional conflicts with local elite groups. Konovalov is once again considering moving to the State Duma. “There will be some interesting dismissals this spring,” an insider succinctly put it. “In general,” one insider summed up, “the current logic is to keep the situation under control, maintain the numbers for recruiting volunteers [to the SVO zone], and prevent a sharp rise in discontent. For now, this approach outweighs any ideas of large-scale rotations.” Rotations in the regions are being postponed until the end of the SVO, according to experts from a Moscow-based analytical center close to the Kremlin. Given that Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Maxim Oreshkin has initiated the process of linking businesses to specific regions, changes in regional leadership can also be expected. This scenario is quite likely, an expert noted. “It must be understood that after the SVO, some beneficiary regions—those with defense enterprises and significant military recruitment—will experience economic downturns, making business support crucial. But businesses will also need a supervisor in these regions.”