🫓 *Caracas Chronicles* | January 31, 2025 🚨 *An Election to Ban Them All, a Reform to Empower Few | #nowwhatvenezuela* ↪️ _Share this report with your friends and family to keep them updated about events in Venezuela every week_ 📍 *_Read the full issue in our website_* https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2025/01/31/nwv-16-an-election-to-ban-them-all-a-reform-to-empower-few/ 🗳️ *What we know about "mega elections" and Communal State reform* ❌ On April 27, Venezuela will hold elections for governors, legislative councils, and lawmakers under far worse conditions than just six months ago. At the same time, the regime is advancing its vision of the Communal State, a project Chávez promoted before passing in 2013 (this Sunday, for instance, another referendum will take place to approve communal projects). This is not just another election under dictatorship, nor are these trivial reforms for everyday life. Chavismo aims to paint Venezuela’s political and territorial map in red, swiftly and effectively eliminating dissent while favoring individuals tied to communal circuits. 🗓️ *Key takeaways about the first elections of 2025:* - To no one’s surprise, candidates must sign a document pledging to accept as absolute and unquestionable any results announced by the CNE. Francisco Ameliach, spokesperson for the PSUV’s Political and Electoral Organization, ruled out the possibility of the opposition’s MUD appearing on the ballot and stated that only political platforms that obtained at least 1% of the vote in the 2020 parliamentary elections would be allowed to participate this time. Maduro’s Liberator Law will also be used to ban dissidents from running. - The announcement comes with barely three months' notice, despite the logistical challenge of combining three different elections into a single date. - Instead of publishing an official notice, the schedule for the mega-elections is being distributed to people via an Excel file on WhatsApp, while the CNE website has been down since July 28 (when Amoroso accused North Macedonia of hacking the institution). - The Electoral Registry will be open for less than two weeks and will close on February 10, suggesting that the distribution of voters across nationwide polling stations will remain largely unchanged from July 28. “The [true and direct democracy] Chávez dreamed of is becoming a reality,” Maduro said regarding Sunday’s communal referendum. “I have the money. And we are releasing the funds to implement these projects.” 🔺 *The Communal State: an attempt to resurrect vintage chavista governance* Rafael Uzcátegui, director of Laboratorio de Paz, analyzed the reform of the Organic Law of Communes or Ley de Comunas, which came into effect on December 30, 2024. Here are some key points: - The legal text states that communes have assumed the responsibilities of local and regional governments—such as management, administration, the control of public services, and public works—but doesn’t explain their relationship with mayoralties and governorships. - A commune can be established with just 15% voter participation in an electoral center, though only the Ministry for Citizen Participation can approve its registration. - Commune representatives can be removed if they engage in “hate speech” or “fascist discourse,” as defined by the regime. - The reform establishes a “commune bank” to transfer funds to the executive council of each commune, though it does not specify the source of these funds. According to Uzcátegui, the revival of the Communal State seeks to reinforce two traditional pillars of chavista governance: 1) existing mechanisms of social control within communities and 2) the creation of more parallel structures to manage and distribute state resources. Most crucially, the reform aims to preserve chavismo’s social base—specifically, the 30% of voters who supported Maduro on July 28. *Why it matters:* In the July 28 presidential election, Maduro won in just 15% of Venezuela’s parishes—169 out of 1,141. These are areas where the PSUV secures votes through the likes of guerrilla groups, armed colectivos, security forces, CLAP food programs, UbCH, and other allied actors who exert clientelist pressure. A recent report from the Derechos Humanos de Venezuela en Movimiento alliance analyzed 133 parishes where Edmundo González lost, finding that vote buying, coercion, food incentives, and threats of job loss were widespread.