# *Detailed SUMMARY of the article "Crisis brakes" by Fahd Humayun, Published in Dawn on June 12th, 2025:* The article examines the deteriorating *crisis management mechanisms* between *India* and *Pakistan*, focusing on events in *May 2025* that revealed how *thin the margin for error* has become in bilateral crises. The author identifies two traditional *"brakes"* that have historically prevented *escalation*: *deterrence* and *outside intervention*. However, both mechanisms are now *dangerously worn*. *Deterrence*, which should activate when escalation costs outweigh gains, has failed as *Indian elites* have become *openly dismissive* of restraint, celebrating the crossing of *unfamiliar thresholds* rather than showing concern. The second brake, *outside intervention*, proved contingent on *US engagement* through *Vice President Vance* and *Secretary of State Rubio*, who intervened at the *eleventh hour* to achieve a *ceasefire*. However, this intervention was *enormously contingent* and uncertain for future crises. Other potential *crisis brokers* like *Beijing*, *Moscow*, *Riyadh*, and *Tehran* proved largely ineffective. The article argues that *deterrence emerged bruised* from the *May crisis* on *four counts*: First, new *escalation ladder rungs* have emerged through *drone* and *loitering munitions attacks*, offering tempting options for *calibrated damage* while normalizing previously non-existent tactics. Second, *India's triumphalist framing* of the *four-day encounter* as an *unambiguous victory*, despite *aircraft losses*, will serve as a *catalyst* in future crises by suggesting *spectacular net gains* are possible. Third, when *escalation* is driven by *public mood* rather than *verifiable intelligence*, leaders lose *political space* to argue for *restraint*, turning crises into tests of *political virility* rather than *strategic necessity*. Fourth, *military stalemates* risk teaching *wrong lessons*, focusing on where *deterrence held* rather than where it *failed*. The author suggests potential solutions including *Pakistan's insistence* on *dialogue*, appointing a *new NSA* to establish *communication channels* and clarify *red lines*, noting that *ambiguity* encourages *reckless experimentation*. *External actors* should reconsider the *widening asymmetry* in *geopolitical arrangements*, as *Pakistan's smaller economy* means it has *less to lose* and *more to gain* in conflict. *India* feels *emboldened* by its *relative weight*, requiring *targeted efforts* to give both players *tangible stakes* in preserving *peace*. The article criticizes *India's domestic ecosystem* for acting as an *accelerant* rather than a *brake* during crises, calling for reforms against *political* and *informational jingoism*. The author concludes that another *India-Pakistan crisis* is a question of *when, not if*, with *traditional brakes eroding*, creating an *urgent imperative* to *reinforce* crisis management mechanisms. Without action, the region risks *vaulting an escalation ladder* whose *lower rungs* are cluttered with *drones* and *manufactured triumphs*, while *upper rungs offer no exits* at all. # *Easy/Short SUMMARY*: *May 2025 events* revealed *India-Pakistan crisis* management is failing as traditional *"brakes"* - *deterrence* and *outside intervention* - are *dangerously worn*. *Indian elites* dismiss *restraint*, celebrating *threshold crossings*. *US intervention* through *VP Vance* and *Secretary Rubio* was *contingent*, while other *mediators* proved ineffective. *Deterrence* is *bruised* due to *new escalation tactics* (*drones*, *loitering munitions*), *India's triumphalist framing*, *public mood-driven escalation*, and *wrong lessons* from *military stalemates*. Solutions include *Pakistan's dialogue* push, *new NSA* appointment, clarifying *red lines*, and addressing *geopolitical asymmetry*. *India's domestic ecosystem* accelerates rather than *brakes* crises. Another crisis is *inevitable* (*when, not if*), requiring *urgent reinforcement* of crisis mechanisms to avoid *vaulting escalation ladders* with *no exits*. # *SOLUTIONS of The Problem*: ## *1. Establish Direct Communication Channels* Create *hotlines* between *NSAs* and military commanders to clarify *red lines* and prevent *miscalculation*. ## *2. Develop Crisis De-escalation Protocols* Formalize *step-by-step procedures* for both countries to follow during *military confrontations*. ## *3. Strengthen Deterrence Framework* Clearly define *escalation thresholds* and *consequences* to restore *credible deterrence*. ## *4. Engage Multiple Mediators* Involve *China*, *Russia*, *Saudi Arabia*, and *Iran* alongside *US* for *crisis mediation*. ## *5. Control Domestic Narratives* Implement *media guidelines* and *political restraint* to prevent *jingoistic escalation*. ## *6. Address Geopolitical Asymmetry* Create *balanced stakes* for both countries in *peace preservation* through *economic cooperation*. ## *7. Regulate New Warfare Technologies* Establish *agreements* on *drone attacks* and *loitering munitions* to prevent *escalation normalization*. ## *8. Promote Track-II Diplomacy* Engage *civil society*, *academia*, and *business communities* in *peace-building efforts*. ## *9. Conduct Joint Military Exercises* Organize *confidence-building measures* and *military-to-military dialogues*. ## *10. Pursue Comprehensive Conflict Resolution* Address *root causes* like *Kashmir dispute* for *long-term peace* and *stability*. # *IMPORTANT Facts and Figures Given in the article*: - Events occurred in *May 2025* between *India* and *Pakistan*. - Crisis lasted *four days* according to *Indian framing*. - *US Vice President Vance* and *Secretary of State Rubio* intervened. - *India* lost *aircraft* during the confrontation. - *New escalation ladder rungs* emerged through *drone* and *loitering munitions*. - *Traditional crisis brakes* are *deterrence* and *outside intervention*. - *Beijing*, *Moscow*, *Riyadh*, and *Tehran* played minimal roles. - *Pakistan* has a *smaller economy* than *India*. - Author is *assistant professor* at *Tufts University*. # *IMPORTANT Facts and Figures out of the article*: - *India-Pakistan* have fought *four wars* since *1947* (*Britannica*, 2024). - Both countries possess *nuclear weapons* since *1998* (*SIPRI*, 2024). - *India's defense budget* is *$76 billion* vs *Pakistan's $7.8 billion* (*IISS*, 2024). - *Kashmir conflict* has lasted *77 years* since *1947* (*UN*, 2024). - *South Asia* has *1.9 billion* people at risk from *nuclear conflict* (*ICAN*, 2024). - *India-Pakistan trade* is only *$2.4 billion* annually (*Export-Import Bank*, 2024). - *US arms sales* to *India* reached *$20 billion* in *2024* (*SIPRI*, 2024). # *MCQs from the Article*: ### 1. *What are the two traditional "brakes" in India-Pakistan crises?* A. Diplomacy and military strength *B. Deterrence and outside intervention* C. Economic sanctions and media pressure D. Nuclear weapons and alliances ### 2. *Who intervened in the May 2025 crisis to achieve ceasefire?* A. UN Secretary-General and EU President *B. US Vice President Vance and Secretary Rubio* C. Chinese Premier and Russian President D. Saudi Crown Prince and Iranian President ### 3. *What new escalation tactics have emerged according to the article?* A. Cyber warfare and space weapons *B. Drone and loitering munitions attacks* C. Economic blockades and sanctions D. Information warfare and propaganda ### 4. *How does the author describe India's framing of the four-day encounter?* A. Balanced assessment B. Diplomatic victory *C. Triumphalist and unambiguous victory* D. Mutual understanding ### 5. *What does the author say about future India-Pakistan crises?* A. They are unlikely to occur B. They depend on external factors *C. They are a question of when, not if* D. They can be easily prevented # *VOCABULARY*: 1. *Deterrence* (ردعیت) – Prevention through fear of consequences 2. *Escalation* (شدت پسندی) – Increase in intensity or severity 3. *Contingent* (منحصر) – Dependent on certain conditions 4. *Prevarication* (چکر) – Evasion or avoiding straight answers 5. *Triumphalist* (فتح مندانہ) – Celebrating victory in an excessive manner 6. *Catalyst* (محرک) – Something that triggers change or action 7. *Guardrails* (حفاظتی اقدامات) – Protective measures or safeguards 8. *Virility* (مردانگی) – Masculine strength or aggressiveness 9. *Stalemates* (تعطل) – Situations where no progress is possible 10. *Asymmetry* (عدم توازن) – Lack of balance or equality 11. *Abetted* (مدد کرنا) – Encouraged or assisted 12. *Emboldened* (ہمت دینا) – Made more confident or bold 13. *Paramount* (اہم ترین) – Of the highest importance 14. *Accelerant* (تیز کرنے والا) – Something that speeds up a process 15. *Jingoism* (انتہا پسندی) – Extreme patriotism or nationalism 16. *Autopsy* (پوسٹ مارٹم) – Detailed examination or analysis 17. *Imperative* (لازمی) – Essential or absolutely necessary 18. *Vaulting* (چھلانگ لگانا) – Jumping or leaping over 19. *Cluttered* (بھرا ہوا) – Filled with many things 20. *Reckless* (لاپرواہ) – Acting without thinking of consequences 📢 *Attention Please!* We appreciate your commitment to acquiring knowledge through our summaries. Please be reminded not to remove the attribution label affixed to this article. It is crucial to acknowledge the source and the effort invested in creating this summary. We discourage any unauthorized distribution without proper credit. Thank you for your understanding and cooperation. 🔍 ⚡ *Explore More Summaries, Solutions, and Vocabulary Meanings* 💡 Join our WhatsApp Channel for timely and comprehensive summaries of the latest articles, along with well-crafted solutions and helpful vocabulary meanings. Click the link below to join now 🔗 [Dawn Article Summaries](https://cssmcqs.com/dawn-editorials-articles-summary-for-students-pdf-download/) *WhatsApp Channel Link*: [https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Va7tT3o35fLnJeFbpS2y](https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Va7tT3o35fLnJeFbpS2y) --- *dawn.com* *Crisis brakes* *Fahd Humayun* *5–6 minutes* EVENTS in May have underscored just how thin the margin for error has become in an India-Pakistan crisis. They also showed that the brakes that managed past crises are now dangerously worn. The first brake in any interstate-crisis ought to be deterrence. Deterrence is meant to kick in once escalation reaches a rung where the costs of further action clearly outweigh any possible gains. But recent weeks have shown Indian elites to not just be sceptical of deterrence theory, but openly dismissive if not contemptuous of restraint, eager to celebrate rather than worry about the crossing of unfamiliar thresholds. The second brake in South Asian crises has historically been outside intervention. Efforts to downplay the fact notwithstanding, high-level US engagement ultimately did prove decisive in helping the two sides reach a ceasefire. But US Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio getting on the phone with both capitals at the eleventh hour was also enormously contingent. Would the previous US administration have invested the same diplomatic capital in pulling India back from the brink? Will a future US administration read signals from the region correctly and in time? Consider, as well, that other possible crisis brokers barely featured. Beijing and Moscow sat on the sidelines; Riyadh and Tehran shuttled between capitals with little effect. Deterrence emerged bruised from the May crisis. This shifts the burden for crisis management back to deterrence. But deterrence itself emerged from the May crisis battered and bruised, on at least four counts. One, the crisis demonstrated the existence of new rungs on the escalation ladder. Drone and loitering munitions attacks now offer both sides a tempting avenue to inflict damage while claiming 'calibration' or 'restraint'. But each successful strike also normalises a rung that didn't exist a decade ago, with little by way of past precedent to inform or guide future behaviour for peer-military competitors. Two, Indian prevarication around the loss of aircraft is just one leg of its triumphalist framing of the four-day encounter as an unambiguous victory. It's that precise framing that will be a catalyst in the next crisis. If the last crisis ended with spectacular net gains, why have any guardrails at all? Three, when escalation is dictated by public mood rather than verifiable intelligence, leaders lose the political space — forget incentive — to argue for restraint. Regardless then of whether you are the incumbent or the opposition, each crisis risks becoming a test of your own political virility rather than strategic necessity. Fourth, crises that end in military stalemates run the risk of ensuring that players walk away having learnt the wrong lessons, focusing on where deterrence held, not where it didn't. This is not to say that Pakistan, and cooler heads in India, few as they may be, don't have space to think differently. Islamabad's insistence on the need for dialogue offers one possible way to dial down the regional temperature. The appointment of a new NSA also suggests the potential for empowering a line of communication before the next crisis, to clarify important red lines and thresholds. While ambiguity may deter in theory, in practice it only encourages reckless experimentation, as seen by India's behaviour in May. External actors, meanwhile, may want to reconsider the widening asymmetry that geopolitical arrangements have partly abetted. Pakistan's smaller economy today means it has less to lose in an all-out conflict, and more to gain in terms of reputation by inflicting even limited damage on a much larger neighbour. India clearly feels emboldened by its relative weight. Targeted efforts to give both players a tangible stake in preserving peace are paramount. But they're also no substitute for actual conflict resolution, which is the only long-term solution that can withstand pressures for a future war. Finally, our neighbour's domestic ecosystem has made clear that it serves to act as an accelerant, not a brake, once a crisis has begun. Brakes against both political and informational jingoism could check domestic incentives for reckless escalation. But those reforms would first require a sincere autopsy and frank gain-loss assessment of the May events. Ultimately, another India-Pakistan crisis is now a question of when, not if. With traditional brakes eroding, there is an urgent imperative to ask what can be done to reinforce them in the short as well as medium term. Else, the region risks not just climbing but vaulting an escalation ladder whose lower rungs seem to be cluttered with everything from drones to manufactured triumphs, and whose upper rungs, truthfully, offer no exits at all. *The writer is an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University.* *Published in Dawn, June 12th, 2025*