The Making of Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb:🇵🇰 From Conception to Detonation and Beyond *AwanXada* By Dr Umer Zubair --- The Genesis: A Response to India’s Nuclear Ambitions Pakistan's journey toward becoming a nuclear power began in earnest after India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, codenamed Smiling Buddha. This sent shockwaves across South Asia. Then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously declared: > “We will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own [nuclear bomb].” This was not just rhetoric—it became a national policy. Bhutto convened a secret meeting of scientists in Multan in 1972, laying the groundwork for Pakistan’s nuclear future. Thus began a decades-long covert mission to balance regional power. --- The Architects of the Bomb: Heroes and Controversies Zulfikar Ali Bhutto As the political father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Bhutto created the vision and secured initial international contacts and resources. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan) A metallurgist trained in Europe, A.Q. Khan brought critical knowledge of uranium enrichment via gas centrifuge technology, allegedly acquired from URENCO, a Dutch nuclear facility. He founded the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1976, becoming the face of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan Head of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Munir favored plutonium-based reactors. Tensions between his team and A.Q. Khan’s uranium-enrichment model marked a silent internal rivalry. General Zia-ul-Haq After toppling Bhutto in 1977, General Zia continued and expanded the nuclear program under tight secrecy, maintaining plausible deniability while accelerating progress. He outmaneuvered international inspections and U.S. intelligence. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand A brilliant physicist, he played a key technical role in Pakistan’s actual nuclear tests in 1998, particularly in weapon design and testing logistics. General Mirza Aslam Beg & General Jehangir Karamat Army chiefs who defended and expanded the nuclear doctrine. Under their leadership, civil-military cooperation over the program became highly synchronized. --- China’s Covert Assistance: A Strategic Partnership While never publicly acknowledged in full, China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program is well-documented by global intelligence communities. Design Blueprints: China is believed to have shared nuclear weapon designs and possibly provided enriched uranium samples. Technology Transfer: Chinese assistance extended to civilian nuclear reactors, including Chashma I and II, helping Pakistan train a generation of nuclear scientists and engineers. Missile Collaboration: The Shaheen missile series and M-11 technology show clear signs of Chinese design. China viewed Pakistan as a strategic counterbalance to India and a buffer against regional instability, making nuclear collaboration mutually beneficial. --- U.S. Pressure and Offers in 1998: Diplomacy vs Deterrence After India’s Pokhran-II nuclear tests in May 1998, pressure mounted on Pakistan to respond. International diplomacy kicked into high gear. The Clinton Call U.S. President Bill Clinton reportedly made multiple phone calls to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, offering: Billions in financial aid Removal of sanctions Access to global financial institutions Security assurances In return, Pakistan was asked not to conduct nuclear tests. Nawaz Sharif was torn between appeasing the West and satisfying national honor. --- Military Pressure: Who Really Made the Decision? Contrary to the public image, Pakistan's military establishment played a decisive role in pushing for the nuclear tests. Army Chief Gen. Jehangir Karamat, DG ISI Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt, and other top generals were unequivocal: any hesitation would portray Pakistan as weak. Several scientists, including Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, confirmed technical readiness. The military reportedly warned the PM of “serious consequences” if the decision was delayed. Ultimately, Nawaz Sharif agreed. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests in the Ras Koh Hills of Chagai, Balochistan. On May 30, a sixth test followed. --- Fallout and Price of Pride: The Economic and Social Costs International Sanctions Pakistan was hit with severe sanctions by the U.S., Japan, and the EU. Aid programs were frozen. Loans and credits were suspended. Foreign Currency Accounts Frozen The Pakistani government suddenly froze all foreign currency accounts to prevent capital flight. This: Destroyed investor confidence Trapped the savings of overseas Pakistanis Dealt a devastating blow to the middle class Rupee Devaluation & Inflation The rupee crashed. Inflation soared. Business confidence nosedived. The economy entered a prolonged recession. --- Corruption and Mismanagement Post-Tests While the nuclear tests were hailed as a triumph, the aftermath exposed deep governance flaws: Billions of dollars from frozen accounts were never fully accounted for. Allegations emerged of funds being used to support elite privileges and secret defense expenditures without transparency. IMF bailouts resumed, saddling the country with debt again by early 1999. --- The Missile Program: The Delivery System Matters Parallel to nuclear development, Pakistan developed delivery mechanisms: Ghauri (liquid-fueled, developed with North Korean help) Shaheen (solid-fueled, likely Chinese-assisted) Babur Cruise Missile and Nasr Tactical Missile Missile capability ensured credible deterrence, making the nuclear arsenal viable beyond mere symbolic value. --- Reactions at Home and Abroad Domestic Sentiment There was a wave of national pride. Streets erupted in celebration. Newspapers declared Pakistan as the "First Islamic Nuclear Power." International Reaction India: Alarmed, but used it to justify its own tests. United States: Condemned the tests, imposed sanctions but later softened the stance after 9/11. Israel: Watched closely; concerned about nuclear proliferation. IAEA: Called for restraint and stronger non-proliferation regimes. --- Strategic Impact: Deterrence, Not Development The nuclear program succeeded in providing Pakistan with a credible deterrent. However: It did not result in peace with India It did not prevent the Kargil War (1999) or military tensions after the Mumbai Attacks (2008) It distracted national priorities from education, health, and economic reform --- Conclusion: Glory and the Grave Cost Becoming a nuclear power gave Pakistan a seat at the high table of global geopolitics. But it came at immense costs: Economic stagnation Institutional corruption Loss of civilian financial trust Increased civil-military imbalance Pakistan’s nuclear capability must now serve as a shield, not a sword. The future lies not in weapons but in wisdom, governance, and upliftment of the people. 🇵🇰🇵🇰🇵🇰