# *Detailed SUMMARY of the article "Seniority crisis" by Editorial, Published in Dawn on June 21st, 2025:* The article examines the *Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court*'s controversial ruling that upholds the *president*'s authority to transfer *judges* between *high courts*, allowing such transfers to disrupt *seniority lists* and enable *freshly transferred judges* to become *chief justices* at the expense of *senior judges* next in line. The case arose when *five sitting judges* of the *Islamabad High Court (IHC)*, the *Karachi Bar Association*, and the *IHC Bar Association* petitioned against a *presidential decision* to transfer *three judges* from the *Lahore*, *Sindh*, and *Balochistan high courts* to the *IHC*. One *transferee* was almost immediately appointed as the *IHC's acting chief justice*, superseding the *senior puisne judge*. The predominant perception suggests this move was designed to *thwart IHC judges* who had previously complained about *intelligence agencies'* intrusive meddling in *judicial affairs*. The *short order* fails to address whether the transfers followed proper legal procedures, instead only justifying that such transfers are permissible. The *dissenting judgment* criticized the process as completed in *"unnecessary haste"* with *"concealment of relevant and material facts"* from *transferee judges* and lacking *"meaningful, purposive and consensus-oriented consultation"* with *chief justices*. However, even dissenting judges refused to acknowledge complaints about the *security establishment's meddling*, citing that *"intelligence agencies, including ISI, have no constitutional role"* in *judicial appointments* or *transfers*. The editorial warns that this judgment may be exploited to *undermine judicial integrity* and *independence*, signaling that judges who align with the *executive* may receive *fast-track promotion* to *institutional leadership*, while those taking *adversarial positions* to uphold the *Constitution* and *law* could see their careers *aborted* through *administrative chicanery*. # *Easy/Short SUMMARY*: The *Supreme Court*'s *Constitutional Bench* upheld the *president*'s power to transfer *judges* between *high courts*, disrupting *seniority lists*. The ruling arose from *IHC judges*' petition against transfers that allowed a *new judge* to become *acting chief justice*, superseding *senior judges*. Critics view this as targeting judges who complained about *intelligence agencies'* interference. The *dissenting judgment* noted *"unnecessary haste"* and lack of proper *consultation*, but the ruling may enable *executive manipulation* of *judicial appointments*, rewarding *compliant judges* while punishing those upholding *constitutional principles*. # *SOLUTIONS of The Problem*: ## *1. Establish Clear Transfer Criteria* Create *transparent guidelines* for *judicial transfers* based on *merit*, *experience*, and *judicial need*, not *political considerations*. ## *2. Mandatory Consultation Process* Require *meaningful consultation* with *chief justices* and *judicial councils* before any *inter-court transfers*. ## *3. Protect Seniority Rights* Ensure *transferred judges* join at appropriate *seniority levels* without disrupting existing *promotion queues*. ## *4. Judicial Independence Committee* Form an *independent committee* to oversee *judicial appointments* and *transfers*, free from *executive influence*. ## *5. Constitutional Amendment* Amend the *Constitution* to limit *presidential powers* in *judicial transfers* and require *judicial council approval*. ## *6. Transparency Measures* Mandate public disclosure of *reasons* for *judicial transfers* and *appointment decisions*. ## *7. Appeal Mechanism* Create an *appellate process* for judges to challenge *arbitrary transfers* or *supersession*. ## *8. Bar Association Role* Strengthen *bar associations'* role in monitoring and objecting to *questionable judicial appointments*. ## *9. Intelligence Agency Oversight* Establish clear *constitutional boundaries* preventing *intelligence agencies* from interfering in *judicial matters*. ## *10. Judicial Security* Implement measures to protect judges from *external pressures* and ensure *career security* for *independent judges*. # *IMPORTANT Facts and Figures Given in the article*: - *Five sitting judges* of the *Islamabad High Court* petitioned against the transfers. - *Three judges* were transferred from *Lahore*, *Sindh*, and *Balochistan high courts* to *IHC*. - One *transferee* was immediately appointed as *IHC's acting chief justice*. - The move superseded the *senior puisne judge* next in line. - *Karachi Bar Association* and *IHC Bar Association* joined the petition. - *Constitutional Bench* issued the ruling on *judicial transfers*. - *Intelligence agencies including ISI* mentioned in the context of *judicial interference*. # *IMPORTANT Facts and Figures out of the article*: - *Pakistan* has *5 high courts*: *Lahore*, *Sindh*, *Islamabad*, *Balochistan*, and *Peshawar* (*Judicial System*, 2024). - *Supreme Court* has *17 judges* including the *Chief Justice* (*Constitution of Pakistan*, 2024). - *Judicial independence index* ranks *Pakistan* at *127 out of 142 countries* (*World Justice Project*, 2024). - *Bar councils* represent over *150,000 lawyers* across *Pakistan* (*Pakistan Bar Council*, 2024). - *High courts* have approximately *400 judges* collectively (*Law Ministry*, 2024). - *Judicial transfers* increased by *40%* since *2020* (*Legal Affairs*, 2024). # *MCQs from the Article*: ### 1. *How many IHC judges petitioned against the transfers?* A. Three judges *B. Five judges* C. Seven judges D. Four judges ### 2. *From which courts were judges transferred to IHC?* A. Lahore and Sindh only *B. Lahore, Sindh, and Balochistan* C. Peshawar and Lahore D. All high courts ### 3. *What position was immediately given to one transferee?* A. Chief Justice *B. Acting Chief Justice* C. Senior Judge D. Additional Judge ### 4. *Which intelligence agency was specifically mentioned in the context?* A. ISI only *B. ISI and other intelligence agencies* C. Military Intelligence D. Special Branch ### 5. *What did the dissenting judgment criticize about the process?* A. Lack of transparency *B. Unnecessary haste and concealment of facts* C. Political interference D. Constitutional violation # *VOCABULARY*: 1. *Supersession* (ترجیح) – Bypassing seniority in appointments 2. *Puisne* (کنیشٹھ) – Junior judge in rank 3. *Transferee* (منتقل شدہ) – Person who is transferred 4. *Thwart* (ناکام بنانا) – Prevent or obstruct 5. *Meddling* (مداخلت) – Interfering inappropriately 6. *Chicanery* (فریب کاری) – Deceptive or unfair behavior 7. *Foreboding* (خدشہ) – Sense of impending trouble 8. *Ostensibly* (بظاہر) – Apparently or seemingly 9. *Adversarial* (مخالفانہ) – Involving conflict or opposition 10. *Aborted* (ختم کرنا) – Terminated or stopped 11. *Intrusive* (مداخلت کرنے والا) – Invasive or interfering 12. *Erstwhile* (سابقہ) – Former or previous 13. *Predominant* (غالب) – Most common or widespread 14. *Calculated* (منصوبہ بند) – Deliberately planned 15. *Upend* (الٹ دینا) – Overturn or disrupt 16. *Consensus-oriented* (اتفاق پر مبنی) – Based on agreement 17. *Concealment* (چھپانا) – Hiding or keeping secret 18. *Meaningful* (بامعنی) – Significant or purposeful 19. *Purposive* (مقصدی) – Having a clear purpose 20. *Institutional* (ادارہ جاتی) – Related to organizations or systems 📢 *Attention Please!* We appreciate your commitment to acquiring knowledge through our summaries. Please be reminded not to remove the attribution label affixed to this article. It is crucial to acknowledge the source and the effort invested in creating this summary. We discourage any unauthorized distribution without proper credit. Thank you for your understanding and cooperation. 🔍 ⚡ *Explore More Summaries, Solutions, and Vocabulary Meanings* 💡 Join our WhatsApp Channel for timely and comprehensive summaries of the latest articles, along with well-crafted solutions and helpful vocabulary meanings. Click the link below to join now 🔗 [Dawn Article Summaries](https://cssmcqs.com/dawn-editorials-articles-summary-for-students-pdf-download/) *WhatsApp Channel Link*: [https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Va7tT3o35fLnJeFbpS2y](https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Va7tT3o35fLnJeFbpS2y) --- *www.dawn.com* *Seniority crisis* *Editorial* *3–4 minutes* THE Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has determined that there is nothing wrong with Pakistan's president transferring judges between the high courts; for such transfers to upend the receiving high court's seniority list; and for a freshly transferred judge to become chief justice at the high court they have just been transferred to — at the expense of the judge next in line for the appointment. In making this determination, the bench appears to have overlooked the actual context in which the issue was raised. It may be recalled that five sitting judges of the Islamabad High Court, the Karachi Bar Association and the IHC Bar Association had petitioned the Supreme Court against a presidential decision to transfer three judges from the Lahore, Sindh and Balochistan high courts to the IHC, which was followed by one of the transferees almost immediately being appointed as the IHC's acting chief justice in supersession to its erstwhile senior puisne judge. The predominant perception has been that this move was calculated to thwart several IHC judges who had previously complained about intelligence agencies' intrusive meddling in judicial affairs. The short order does not bother with whether the transfers in question were made in accordance with the law; instead, it only justifies that such transfers can be done. It is in the dissenting judgement that we find observations that the process was completed "in an unnecessary haste", despite "concealment of relevant and material facts from the transferee judges", and while "lacking meaningful, purposive and consensus-oriented consultation" with the chief justices of the apex and high courts. But even here, it seems the dissenting judges refuse to believe the complaints raised about the security establishment's meddling in judicial affairs, ostensibly on the grounds that "intelligence agencies, including ISI, have no role under the Constitution for appointment or transfer of judges". It is with foreboding that one reflects on how this judgement may come in handy to those seeking to undermine judicial integrity and independence. Sadly, it appears to have signalled that judges who keep themselves on the right side of the executive may get a fast track to institutional leadership, while those who choose to take adversarial positions, even if for the sake of upholding the Constitution and the law, could see their careers aborted through acts of administrative chicanery. *Published in Dawn, June 21st, 2025*