COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION Section 12 - Exclusion of time in legal proceedings – (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or when an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded shall also be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. According to sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, the first day i.e., the day from which a period of limitation is to be computed must be excluded. And the last day i.e., the day on which the suit is instituted must be included in the calculation. This rule is applicable whenever time has to be computed from a day specified whenever such time is fixed performance of contract or is prescribed by law for the doing of an act or for the institution of the proceedings in a Court of Law. In M. Narayan Reddy Vs H.C Venkatesh (AIR 2010 Karnataka 40), it has been held that in calculating the period of limitation, which is 3 years the date of execution of the promissory note has to be excluded in view of section 12. In Krishna Bilas v. Sonadhan, (AIR 1961 Tripura 16), it is held that in a suit of recovery of possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the day of dispossession is to be excluded. In Ram Nandan v. Ramadhar, [AIR 1966 Pt. 297 (FB)], it has been held that in computing the limitation for filing appeal against the Panchayat election, the date of declaration of the result of the election is to be excluded. In R. Hamira v. Bani Mani, [(1976) 17 Guj.L.R. 729], it is held that the day on which the judgment is pronounced should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for an appeal. The limitation for filing an appeal commences from the date of the judgment and not from the date of decree is signed. In State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Prosad, (AIR 1994 SC 501), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in the matter of setting aside the award the date on which the filing of the award was made known to the advocate of the applicant has to be excluded under Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act. In Saketh India Ltd. v India Securities Lt. (AIR 1999 SC 1090), the notice of returning of the cheque as unpaid was served on the drawer on 29- 09-1995. The period of 15 days for making payment the drawer under the proviso (c) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is expired on 14- 10-1995. Therefore, the cause of action to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arose on 15-10-1995. In computing the one month limitation period under Section 142(b) for filing a complaint against the drawer the date of 15-10-1995 is to be excluded. The Court has held that the complaint filed on 15-11-1995 is within time as it has been filed on the 30th day excluding 15-10-1995. According to Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals, an application for leave to appeal, an application for the review of judgment and also to an application or a petition for revision. Section 12(2) is not of general application but only applies to specific categories mentioned therein. In India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani, (AIR 2003 SC 2084), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that no application seeking benefit of Section 12(2) is required and Court is bound by statute to extend the benefit where applicable and no formal application is required to be made. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Madanlal, (AIR 1977 SC 523), it has been held that it would be impermissible to read in Section 12(2) a proviso that the time for obtaining the copy shall be excluded only if such copy has to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal or application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of judgment. In Punni v. State, (AIR 1971 All. 387), it has been held, following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.A. Gaffore v. Ayesha Begum, (1970 UJ (SC) 784), that exclusion of time is allowed even when copy is not required to be filed along with the memorandum. In Krishnji v. N.R. Malti, (AIR 1972, Mys. 274), it is held that when the appeal against the date of signing the decree has to be excluded. In Jagiri v. Doulat, (AIR 1928 Lah. 755), it has been held that an appellant is entitled to deduct the time spent in obtaining a copy of the first judgment of the trial Court as well as of the judginent passed on review. In Udayan Chinubhai v. R.C. Bali, (AIR 1977 SC 2319), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act read with the Explanation, the appellant is not entitled to exclude the time that had elapsed from the date of the judgment till signing of the decree prior to his application for a copy thereof in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. According to sub-section (3) of Section 12, the time spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment also will be excluded, because it is generally necessary that the judgment on which the decree of the High Court is based should be obtained in order that the parties may ascertain what its terms are, and further filed with the application for leave to appeal. In computing the period of limitation for an application for leave to appeal the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment complained of must be excluded. (Baldeo Pershad v. Dwarika, AIR 1957 All. 334). In applying for leave to appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court the applicant was not entitled to get any time spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment deducted in computing the period of limitation. (Deep Chand v. Bhago, AIR 1965 Punj. 115). According to sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, the period for obtaining copy of the award to be excluded in computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award. An appeal for execution does not fall in any of the categories of legal proceedings mentioned in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that this section is not applicable to an application for execution. In Shahjahan Begum v. Zahirul Hasan, (AIR 1972 All. 511), the Allahabad High Court has held that the Explanation in Section 12 implies that the time requisite for obtaining copy is the time taken by the Court in preparing the decree or order before the application for copy is made as also the time taken in preparing the copy after the application therefor has been made. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs Maharaja Narain, (AIR 1968 SC 960), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘time requisite’ under section 12 cannot be understood as the time absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of the order. The words ‘time requisite’ for obtaining the copy of the decree means the time beyond the party’s control occupied in obtaining copy.